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Libertarian Scholars on the Common Law, Roman Law, and Civil Law

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In a 2004 lecture, Hans-Hermann Hoppe made what he called “a little side remark” about the “certain amount of pride” English speakers take in their common law, and about how “Anglo-Saxons looked down on codified law.” I think something similar is true of many libertarian scholars. Below I collect some thoughts on why libertarians tend to default to the common law, what the Roman and civil law get right, how some of the best insights here have come from outsiders, and the trade-off we face between radical but amateur libertarians and learned but conventional experts. This expands on an update I recently made to my post on the title-transfer theory of contract.1

1. Hoppe’s “Little Side Remark”

Here is Hoppe’s comment, from his lecture “The Production of Law and Order: Natural Order, Feudalism, and Federalism” (YouTube), starting at 1:07:30:

In this connection, let me make a little side remark. In English-speaking countries, America and England, there is a certain amount of pride in having the so-called common law, which is, in a way, noncodified law, or case law. The Continental tradition, as you know, has been for a long time different. There, we have had codified law taken from the Romans, especially from the East Romans who had codified this law for the first time in an extensive manner and then, of course, in modern times, the Napoleonic Code, which has been taken over by most Continental European states in one form or another with some modifications. And, as I said, Anglo-Saxons looked down on codified law and hailed their own noncodified common law. I want to just remark that, for instance, Max Weber has a very interesting observation regarding this. He sees the reason for the noncodification of the common law in the self-interest of the lawyers to make the law difficult to understand for the layman and thus make a lot of money. He emphasizes that codified law makes it possible for the layman on the street who can read to study the law book himself and go to court himself and point out, here, that this law is written down. So, maybe this excessive pride that the Anglo-Saxons have in their common law might be a little bit overdrawn.2

Hoppe is not the first to notice the lawyers’ self-interest here. Alexis de Tocqueville, visiting America in the 1830s, observed that “American men of law emphatically sing the praises of the common law” and “oppose codification with all their powers,” for two reasons: “If a code of laws was made, they would have to begin their studies again,” and, “The law becoming accessible to the common herd, they would lose a part of their importance. They would no longer be like the Egyptian Priests, the sole interpreters of an occult science.” Edward Livingston, a principal drafter of the Louisiana Civil Code, “told me straight out,” Tocqueville added, “that the lawyers who were of an opposite opinion had an interest in the matter.”3 It’s not surprise some lawyer would opposing making the law more accessible to laymen—the same reason public school teachers favor public schools and patent lawyers defend IP, and so on.4 As Upton Sinclair observed, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” (All this said, there are good reasons to oppose legislative codification—not because a code puts the law in writing and makes it accessible, but when the code is enacted as a statute, which enshrines legislation as the supreme source of law.5 )

Hoppe’s point is narrower than “the civil law is better than the common law.” It is about codified versus uncodified law: a written code lets “the layman on the street” read the law himself, while an uncodified body of case law serves the lawyers who alone can navigate it.6 In the same lecture Hoppe notes that medieval free cities often had written codes—“Magdeburg Law or Hamburg Law or Hanover Law or Lübeck Law”—and that new cities would simply adopt an existing one, so that “some law codes became the law codes, not just of one city, but of many, many cities.”7 That is codification spreading by imitation and choice, not imposed by a legislature.

Elsewhere Hoppe makes the related point that legislation itself—“democratic law-making,” as he calls it—breeds uncertainty: law “becomes increasingly flexible and unpredictable,” time preferences rise, and “the respect for all laws will be systematically undermined.”8

What I find impressive is how subtle Hoppe’s view is, for someone who is not a lawyer (his training is in philosophy, sociology, and economics). He sees what the Roman-derived civil law and the common law have in common—both are largely the products of decentralized law-finding—and he sees the benefits of having the law written down. But he does not fall into the legal-positivist trap of equating law with written law, or written law with legislation. Libertarians tend to make one of two mistakes here. Some simply equate law with legislation (see section 2, below). Others, critical of legislation, prefer the common law to the civil law because they regard legislative positivism—the code enacted as a statute—as the civil law’s defining feature.9 Hoppe keeps these things distinct. He can appreciate a written code, and the decentralized Roman origins of the civil law, without accepting the need for, or the utility of, enacting it as legislation—hence his dismissive label for legislation: “democratic law-making.”

That is my view too. What we need is something like a private codification or restatement—in the tradition of the Roman jurists collected in Justinian’s Digest, or of Coke and Blackstone—not a code “enacted by a legislature as a statute (as happened with the French Code Napoleon).”10 Hoppe, schooled in the German tradition, also seems more alert to comparative law than many Anglo-American legal scholars. As we will see, he is not the only outsider to get something important right here.

2. Why Libertarians Default to the Common Law

Something similar to Hoppe’s point could be said of many libertarian thinkers, perhaps influenced by Hayek, Leoni, and others, who appreciate the benefits of the decentralized common law but are somewhat ignorant of the equally decentralized, and in some ways superior, Roman law and the civil law built on it.11 Part of this is simple familiarity: most libertarian scholars are American or British, and the common law is what they know. Part of it is an old habit of English insularity (on this, see also the comments below re Randy Barnett and parallels between his consent theory of contract and civil law doctrines). As Edward Re noted, quoting Professor Burdick, English writers’ views of how much the common law owes to Roman law have been colored by “pride in the alleged indigenous laws of their own country, and prejudice, perhaps, against foreign influence”—even though “the roots of the common law of England are not exclusively Anglo-Saxon.”12

And part of it is Hayek. Libertarians rightly learned from Hayek and Leoni to see law as an evolved, decentralized order—“discovered not made,” as Gerald O’Driscoll summarized Hayek’s view—though I dislike the unnecessary and overused Hayekian term “spontaneous.”13

The irony is that Hayek and Leoni themselves knew better. After all, both were Europeans, steeped in the European Roman/civil law. In fact Hayek pointed out that classical Roman law was “almost entirely the product of law-finding by jurists,” developed “by a process very similar to that by which later the English common law developed,” and Leoni held up the classical Roman jurist, alongside the English judge, as his model of the law-finder.14 But both also told a more Anglocentric story—Hayek, that liberty under law survived in England because it “escaped a wholesale reception of the late Roman law”; Leoni, that the free market “was at its height in the English-speaking countries when the common law was practically the only law of the land relating to private life and business”—and that is the part of the story that seems to have stuck.15 It now even comes with regressions attached: Paul Mahoney found that common-law countries grew faster than civil-law countries from 1960 to 1992—as his title put it, “Hayek Might Be Right.”16

Yet the libertarian preference for the common law is rarely based on a principled opposition to legislation. Hayek himself held that “grown” law can lead “into an impasse” requiring “correction by deliberate legislation.”17 Murray Franck, writing in the Objectivist IOS Journal, argued that “The common law often requires legislation to correct it.”18 Randy Barnett has suggested that legal rights (including legislation) “generated by a sound legal process may even be entitled to presumptive legitimacy.”19 And Objectivists generally are “not opposed to a state,” nor “to its use of legislation as a means of ‘making’ law.”20 As Leoni observed, “the very idea that the law might not be identical with legislation seems odd both to students of law and to laymen”—and, I would add, to many libertarians.21 For most of them, the common law appeals as an example of Hayekian “spontaneous order,” not because they think law should be found rather than legislated.

Not all free-market scholars have been starry-eyed about the common law, though. Peter Aranson argued that the law-and-economics picture of common-law judges as wealth maximizers turns them into central planners, facing the same economic calculation problem.22

3. What the Roman and Civil Law Get Right

I have long regarded the Roman-derived civil law as superior to the common law in many respects; that “Roman law is superior conceptually and substantively, and more compatible with libertarianism and Austrianism.”23 Take property, for example. As I have noted, “Civil law is also superior since Roman law principles are often more coherent and streamlined in comparison to the clunkier, feudalism-based concepts of the common law.”24 This feudalistic hangover even taints American law by replacing the King as feudalistic overlord with the state, although of course states in Europe also regulate and tax land as if they are feudalistic overlord.25 In the civil law, ownership is allodial, there are no “estates” in land, and land “is not ‘conveyed’ by deed but is sold”—by the same contract, and on the same principles, as an automobile.26 Even F.H. Lawson, who defended English law, conceded that to anyone trained in Roman law, English real property law appeared as “a veritable jungle of concepts,” and nineteenth-century common-law treatise writers “borrowed a vast amount from continental law, which already had a systematic doctrinal structure,” including the very distinction between contract and tort.27

Or take contract. The civil law replaces the common law’s “irrational” requirement of consideration with the more sensible concept of “cause,” and it has no trouble enforcing gratuitous transfers.28 Even Richard Epstein, a brilliant champion of the common law, concedes that the English rule of Pinnel’s Case, under which a creditor’s acceptance of a lesser sum does not discharge the debt, is “inferior to the Roman rule.”29 Epstein, trained in Roman law before he studied American law, says that “Having studied two legal systems is, I think, the single greatest advantage that I’ve ever had in legal education.”30 Unlike many American libertarian thinkers, then, Epstein appreciates the Roman law. But so far as I am aware he is not opposed to legislation as such; he thinks it is sometimes desirable—for example, to fix a definite limitations period, a bright-line number that courts are unlikely to arrive at on their own.31 And he favors patent and copyright, which are purely creatures of statute.32

None of this means the civil codes are ideal. They are still legislation, and the superior qualities of the civil law “are not due to its legislated character but to the superior legal concepts that evolved in the Roman law.”33 If the civil code were instead “a private, unlegislated codification, judges could simply ignore its illiberal provisions.”34 This is why I side with James Carter, who fought David Dudley Field’s attempt to legislatively codify New York’s common law: under a statute, as Carter put it, “The dispute is about words,” not justice.35 What we want is decentralized law-finding—by Roman jurists, common-law judges, or private arbitrators—aided by private, not legislated, codes and treatises: the kind of codes Hoppe’s medieval cities adopted by choice.36

4. Outsiders Who Got It Right

Hoppe is not the only non-lawyer to see something many lawyers miss. The title-transfer theory of contract was pioneered by Murray Rothbard and Williamson Evers: “Rothbard sketched the theory in 1974; Evers elaborated on it in 1977…. But neither were lawyers and only took this analysis so far.”37 Their approach dispenses with consideration and readily accommodates gratuitous transfers, as the civil law does—though it goes further than the civil law in rejecting binding promises and obligations altogether.

Barnett’s consent theory, which grounds contract in a manifested intent to be legally bound, is likewise closer to the civil law than to the common law’s bargain theory.38 As the comparativist James Maxeiner pointed out, “It astonishes that in the twenty years that Barnett’s proposal has been on the table, apparently no American contracts scholar has remarked on the similarities of his theory to the Civil Law”—as if “someone in the United States announced the discovery of Pasteurization a century after Pasteur introduced it in France.” Maxeiner reports that “Barnett has told me that he was not aware of Continental European law when he proposed his theory,” and concludes “that American scholars simply were unaware of the foreign law.”39  In effect, on Maxeiner’s account, Barnett was rediscovering widely known civilian doctrine without realizing it. Arriving at a civilian-style theory on one’s own is no small feat; but that no one noticed for twenty years says a lot about American legal insularity. (Maxeiner also notes that Barnett’s approach to form contracts resembles Germany’s standard-terms law, which is “far more robust”; I discuss this in my recent update to the TTTC paper.)40 This supports Epstein’s observation, quoted above. about the advantage of studying both Roman and common law.41

Here too the civil law is instructive. Under the French and Louisiana codes, a sale transfers ownership by consent alone: “Transfer of ownership required only mutual consent on object and price, not delivery of the article into the purchaser’s possession.”42 Consent is not a rival to title transfer; it is how title is transferred. This can serve as an example of how familiarity with existing legal doctrine can be useful for developing libertarian theory related to property rights and contract. As I wrote previously, “The owner of property may convey title to another, for any reason, whether pecuniary, charitable, or arbitrary, by manifesting and communicating his intent to do so.”43

Another example is Jesús Huerta de Soto, who uses Roman-law concepts—the irregular deposit versus the mutuum, or loan—to cut through the confusion surrounding fractional-reserve banking.44 Huerta de Soto has legal as well as economic training, but Rothbard and Evers did not, and they still pioneered valuable insights into contract theory. And the civil law gave me a tool for classifying IP: patents and copyrights are best seen as “nonconsensual negative servitudes granted by state fiat.”45 As far as I know, no legal scholar has yet made this connection; I plan to develop it in a longer law review article.

5. The Hobson’s Choice

This is something that has gradually dawned on me over the years. As I wrote recently to Randy Barnett:

familiarity with both common law approaches as well as those of the civil and Roman law, can be very helpful in sorting out a host of legal and related issues—especially for the libertarian minded, if combined with an awareness of the radical libertarian view of the state and of Austrian economics…. I find this is often the case: more radical thinkers usually are academic outsiders and lack the normal conventional depth in a field they are commenting on, but with insightful, if raw, proposals, while the standard experts have more depth but it is narrower, conventional and bereft of the perspective of the radicals and outsiders. It’s exceedingly rare to find someone who combines both, so one must get what one can from each, aware of the limitations of each. Such is life.

It is a kind of Hobson’s choice. As I put it in a tribute to Sean Gabb, “it is generally rare to find a libertarian who is also deeply learned as a standard scholar.” Libertarians “tend to have a more sound general perspective on politics, the state, and economics,” but “they are not usually the top recognized scholars in the field”; the mainstream experts “know their fields very well and deeply, but will invariably mangle something” because “their mainstream views on economics and the state contaminate their analysis.”46 In legal theory, “many libertarian authors are economists or philosophers who are not sufficiently familiar with the workings of real legal systems; others are not completely or consistently libertarian in their approaches.”47 As I wrote of Richard Epstein, “Too many libertarians are weak on sophisticated legal theory,” while most legal experts are statists or positivists; “Epstein is the rare thinker who combines both: deep knowledge of a mainstream discipline and a radical, libertarian approach to politics, economics, and the state”—even if I disagree with his minarchism, his utilitarianism, and his support for IP.48 Such scholars—Epstein in law, Hoppe in social theory, Huerta de Soto on money and banking—are worth their weight in gold. The rest of the time, we take what we can from each camp, knowing the limits of each.

Conclusion

Libertarians are right to prize decentralized, judge-found law over legislation. But the common law is only one example of it, and not always the best one. The classical Roman law was at least as decentralized, and its concepts—in property, contract, and elsewhere—are often cleaner and more compatible with libertarian principles. As I said at PFS 2025, it “would be stupid to throw out the accumulated wisdom” of the Roman and common law.49 The task is to learn from both, sift them in light of libertarian principles, and resist the urge—common among lawyers and libertarians alike—to mistake legislation for law. Hoppe, Rothbard, and Evers show that you need not be a lawyer to see this. But it helps to know more than one legal system.

Related

Legislation, Codification, and Law

Roman Law, Civil Law, and Common Law

Applying Civil-Law Concepts: Contract, Banking, IP

Libertarians and Legal Scholarship

  1. Kinsella, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract,” StephanKinsella.com (Sept. 2024; updated 2026).
  2. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economy, Society, and History (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2021), p. 111. I also quote and discuss this passage in Kinsella, “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023), ch. 13, pp. 346–47 and n.152; idem, “Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases,” StephanKinsella.com (Dec. 19, 2022); and idem, “KOL474 | Where the Common Law Goes Wrong (PFS 2025),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Sep. 19, 2025).
  3. Shael Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States (Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1993), p. 23 and n.52 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, pp. 301–02; and noting that Livingston “played a capital role in the preparation of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, and his distrust of judicial lawmaking was well known”).
  4. See my posts C4IP and C-IP2: For IP, not Innovation (Oct. 1, 2026); Attempts to Get on Mainstream IP Podcast and AIPLA Quarterly Journal Predictably Fail (April 24, 2026); Zeidman, Why Libertarians Should Support a Strong Patent System; (Feb. 1, 2026).
  5. See section 3, below; LFFS, ch. 13, p. 297 (“the civil law enshrines legislation as the primary source of law”), p. 341 (the civil code “contains many illiberal and thus illegitimate provisions, which are a problem only because the code is legislated into law”), p. 348 (“we should oppose efforts to codify the common law in various jurisdictions and enact them as positive legislation”), and Appendix (“Legislative Supremacy in the Civil Code”), p. 350 et seq.; Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code, p. 18 (in declaring law “a ‘solemn expression of the legislative will,’” the Louisiana drafters “were subscribing to the doctrine of legislative supremacy”); Kinsella, “Another Problem with Legislation: James Carter v. the Field Codes,” StephanKinsella.com (Oct. 14, 2009); idem, “KOL506 | Private Law and the Universal Principles of Liberty: World Liberty Summit 2026–Bolivia,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Nov. 12, 2026) (calling for a private codification, not a code “enacted by a legislature as a statute”).
  6. On the value of written statements of the law that do not depend on legislation, see LFFS, ch. 13, pp. 345–46 (that civil codes are legislated “does not detract from the value of having an elegant written summary of the law prepared by legal scholars distilling and summarizing the body of private law developed in more or less decentralized systems over the ages”), and Part V.B (“The Role of Commentators and Codes”); Kinsella, “On the Role of Commentators and Codes and the Oracles of the Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 31, 2025); idem, “Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases” (the “‘libertarian’ sections of Roman law, e.g. as embodied in modern civil codes, could be adopted”); idem, “KOL506”; and idem, “Announcing the Universal Principles of Liberty,” PFS Blog (Aug. 18, 2025).
  7. Hoppe, Economy, Society, and History, p. 111, as quoted in LFFS, ch. 13, p. 346.
  8. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Time Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization—From Monarchy to Democracy,” J. des Économistes et des Études Humaines 5, no. 2/3 (June/Sept. 1994): 319–49, at 340, quoted in LFFS, ch. 13, p. 313 and n.61. On legislation, uncertainty, and time preference generally, see Kinsella, “Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society,” LFFS, ch. 13, Part III.B.4 (“Negative Effects of Uncertainty”), pp. 312–16; and idem, “Legislation and Law in a Free Society,” Mises Daily (Feb. 25, 2010), a shorter version of that chapter.
  9. I have said this myself—“the defining characteristic of the civil code-based legal systems is legal positivism”—while stressing that “the real distinction is between decentralized legal systems–Roman law and the original English common law–and centralized legal systems like the modern civil law.” Kinsella, “The Superiority of the Roman Law: Scarcity, Property, Locke and Libertarianism,” StephanKinsella.com (Aug. 17, 2010). Civilian codifiers themselves helped spread the confusion: as Herman notes, they perpetuated “a common misinterpretation … that classical Roman law had no important case law development.” Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code, p. 75 n.51.
  10. Kinsella, “KOL506.” (describing the Universal Principles of Liberty as “a concise private codification of the principles any just legal order must respect”); see also LFFS, ch. 13, Part V.B (“The Role of Commentators and Codes”); Kinsella, “On the Role of Commentators and Codes and the Oracles of the Law”; idem, “Roman Law and Hypothetical Cases.”
  11. See LFFS, ch. 13, p. 345 (“many libertarians in the past have tended to favor the English common law over competing systems, including modern civil law, even though the civil codes, although legislated, are elegant codifications of private law principles that themselves evolved in the decentralized Roman Law legal system”); “KOL474” (free-market scholars have studied the common law while the Roman law is “largely ignored and given short shrift”). As Peter Stein observes, a common lawyer asked to name the most obvious difference between the two systems “will probably answer that the civil law is based on Roman law whereas the common law is relatively immune from Roman influence”—yet the classical Roman law “is in many respects closer in character to the common law than it is to modern civil-law systems that are derived from Roman law.” Peter G. Stein, “Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law,” Tul. L. Rev. 66, no. 6 (1991–92): 1591–1604, at 1591.
  12. Edward D. Re, “The Roman Contribution to the Common Law,” Fordham L. Rev. 29, no. 3 (1961): 447, at 453 and n.26 (quoting Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law, p. 56; and quoting Roscoe Pound: “The Anglo-American is averse to authorities in a foreign tongue”), 454 (quoting Ben W. Palmer on “a certain insular patriotism which may have affected English legal historians”), and 470–71 n.108 (quoting Pollock and Maitland on “the natural disinclination of Englishmen to admit that this ‘palladium of our liberties’ [trial by jury] is in its origin not English but Frankish, not popular but royal”); idem, “The Roman Contribution to the Common Law” (Eighth Annual Brendan F. Brown Lecture), Loy. L. Rev. 39 (1993): 295, at 310.
  13. Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., “Hayek’s System of Principles,” Libertarian Review (Oct. 1978): 39–41, reprinted in Kinsella, “O’Driscoll on ‘Hayek’s System of Principles’ (1978),” PFS Blog (July 28, 2026). On the term “spontaneous,” see LFFS, ch. 13, pp. 309–10 n.48 (“if writing this now, I would avoid the term ‘spontaneous’ since it is problematic and intermixed with some of Hayek’s views that I now disagree with on the knowledge problem and how the market functions…. I believe the term ‘spontaneous’ as used by Hayekians can be confusing and misleading”); and Kinsella, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law,” in LFFS, ch. 19, p. 533 (criticizing Barnett’s use of “Hayekian terms such as ‘spontaneous’ and ‘coordination’”: “Nothing seems to be gained except confusion and lack of clarity by replacing perfectly good terms like private property and anarcho-capitalism with inferior terms”).
  14. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, one-vol. ed. (London: Routledge Classics, 2013 [1973–79]), vol. 1, ch. 4, p. 79; Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, expanded 3d ed. 1991 [1961]), ch. 4 (“Private Roman law, which the Romans called jus civile, was kept practically beyond the reach of legislators”; “The Roman jurist was a sort of scientist”; “like their modern successors, the English judges, Roman jurists never bothered about abstract principles”). See also Peter H. Aranson, “Bruno Leoni in Retrospect,” Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 11 (1988): 661–711, at 669; and Leonard P. Liggio and Tom G. Palmer, “Freedom and the Law: A Comment on Professor Aranson’s Article,” Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 11 (1988): 713–25, at 720 (quoting Leoni on the Roman jurist).
  15. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p. 80 (England “escaped a wholesale reception of the late Roman law and with it the conception of law as the creation of some ruler”); idem, “The Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 162 (the “common law conception of justice” and the ideals of the rule of law “were little understood outside the Anglo-Saxon world”); Leoni, Freedom and the Law, ch. 4; see also Leonard P. Liggio, “Law and Legislation in Hayek’s Legal Philosophy,” Sw. U. L. Rev. 23 (1994): 507–29. On Hayek’s contrast between “British” evolutionary rationalism and “French” Cartesian rationalism, see LFFS, ch. 13, Part IV, pp. 329–31.
  16. Paul G. Mahoney, “The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,” J. Legal Stud. 30, no. 2 (2001): 503–25 (attributing the difference to the common law’s “greater security of property and contract rights”). See also Vincent J. Geloso, “Hayek and Economic History,” in Rosolino A. Candela, ed., A Companion to F. A. Hayek (Guatemala: Universidad Francisco Marroquín, 2025), pp. 197–210, at 204 (citing Mahoney as testing “Hayek’s insights regarding the superiority of Common Law in terms of securing economic growth”).
  17. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 88, quoted in LFFS, ch. 13, p. 334 and nn.122–23; see also Kinsella, “Regret: The Glory of State Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 31, 2008) (“Hayek also believed that case-law might need occasional ‘correction’ by the legislature”). Just one of many of Hayek’s many flawed positions. See, e.g., Hoppe, Hoppe on Hayek; idem,  “The Hayek Myth” (PFS 2012); idem, F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique, in The Great Fiction, originally in Rev. Austrian Econ. 7, no. 1 (1993); idem, Why Mises (and not Hayek)?; Kinsella, Knowledge vs. Calculation, Mises Blog (July 11, 2006); idem, Don’t tell me to read Hayek; idem, “Second Thoughts on Leoni, Hayek, Legislation, and Economic Calculation,” The Libertarian Standard (May 9, 2014);  (Feb. 8, 2016).
  18. Murray Franck, “Intellectual and Personality Property,” IOS Journal 5, no. 3 (Sept. 1995), p. 7, reprinted in Kinsella, “Letter on Intellectual Property Rights, IOS Journal (June 1995),” C4SIF Blog (Aug. 31, 2022).
  19. Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), as quoted in Kinsella, “Higher Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 24, 2007), n.1 (responding that “statutory, positive law deserves no respect, is not real law”).
  20. Kinsella, “Why Objectivists Hate Anarchy (Hint: IP),” StephanKinsella.com (Aug. 17, 2009).
  21. LFFS, ch. 13, p. 298 and n.8 (quoting Leoni, Freedom and the Law, p. 6).
  22. Peter H. Aranson, “The Common Law as Central Economic Planning,” Const. Pol. Econ. 3, no. 3 (1992): 289–319, at 289 (“Neither advocates of central planning nor those of judicial wealth maximizing address or solve the economic calculation problem”) and 292 (although “[e]nthusiasm for the common law remains,” a deeper understanding of its process and of the limits of the common-law-efficiency literature has “tempered that enthusiasm”); idem, “Bruno Leoni in Retrospect,” pp. 692, 697–98; LFFS, ch. 13, pp. 326–27 and nn.98–100.
  23. Kinsella, “The Superiority of the Roman Law.”
  24. Kinsella, “The Superiority of the Roman Law.” On the contrast between the civil law’s unitary, Roman-derived concept of ownership and the common law’s feudal fragmentation of property into estates, see Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, “An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property,” Notre Dame Law Review 88, no. 1 (2012): 1 (the civil law “starts with a strong notion of full ownership—dominion—and then grudgingly carves lesser interests out of it,” whereas “the common law emphasizes the estate system and its many methods of carving up property”; indeed, “[t]echnically, under the full feudal interpretation of the common law, only the monarch has full ownership”); Sally Brown Richardson, “A Tribute to Thanassi: The Influence of Justinian on American Common Law Property,” Louisiana Law Review 78, no. 4 (2018): 1111, 1112 (“The very notion that an individual can own property is theoretically foreign to the common law,” while “ownership is a bedrock of civil law property,” which has “a finite set of rights that are included in ownership, namely the rights of usus, fructus, and abusus”; the common law’s “bundle of sticks,” by contrast, “is, it seems, ever-morphing”); and Konstanze von Schütz, “Keeping It Private: The Impossibility of Abandoning Ownership and the Horror Vacui of the Common Law of Property,” McGill Law Journal 66, no. 4 (2021): 721, 739–40 (under the feudal system imposed after the Norman Conquest, “all land had to be held by someone,” a background that “resonates in much of today’s land law (e.g., with the organization of landholding in a system of estates)”). See also George A. Sheets, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Herbert Hausmaninger & Richard Gamauf, A Casebook on Roman Property Law, trans. George A. Sheets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), xix–xxi (noting, “despite the common law’s still recognizable origin in feudal tenures, the massive influence of Roman law” on common-law property, from easements and adverse possession to the very distinction between possession and ownership; quoting Justice Blackburn in Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314 (Q.B. 1863): “Although the Civil law is not of itself authority in an English Court, it affords great assistance in investigating the principles on which the law is grounded”; and describing Justinian’s Institutes as presenting “Roman law as a logically coherent and comprehensive system of doctrines”). Perhaps partly for such reasons, Professor Yiannopoulos was fond of exclaiming, “The civil law is beautiful.” Gregory W. Rome, Civil Law Property Outline & Case Briefs (New Orleans: Straylight Publishing, 2025), vii.
  25.  Kinsella, Peculium, and the State as Overlord (Aug. 11, 2005).
  26. Patrick H. Martin and J. Lanier Yeates, “Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas Law: An Overview of the Differences,” La. L. Rev. 52, no. 4 (March 1992): 769–860, at 782–84, 787–88 (“Ownership in Louisiana is allodial”; “‘Estates’ in the common law sense of the word are neither part of Louisiana civil law, nor does the law embrace any division between legal and equitable title”; “Ownership of land and of an automobile are analytically identical”; the civil law “promotes commercialization of all property, including land, whereas the common law adheres to notions born in the age of feudalism”; in the early 1800s Louisiana real property law “could be contrasted for its simplicity, unity, precision and clearness with the intricacy, complexity, uncertainty and indistinctness of the law of real property prevailing in common law America”). See also Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code, p. 46 (the French drafters “elaborated a highly stylized, streamlined system of ownership free of the privileges enjoyed by church and nobility under the ancien regime and devoid of feudal burdens upon land”); LFFS, ch. 13, pp. 340–41 and n.140 (the civilian system of property rights “is much cleaner and conceptually more sound than common law real property”), and p. 348 and n.153; ch. 9, p. 220 n.31.
  27. F.H. Lawson, The Rational Strength of English Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951) (Hamlyn Lectures, 3d series), p. 76 (also conceding that “the Roman law of property is remarkably, not to say deceptively, simple”). Tellingly, Lawson goes on to praise English real property law as “superior to all foreign laws dealing with this subject”—but only after noting that Parliament, “in the great property legislation of 1925,” had “enormously simplified” it. So much for the superiority of judge-found law. James Gordley, “The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business,” Cal. L. Rev. 88, no. 6 (2000): 1815–76, at 1819, 1821; see also ibid., p. 1820 (in property and restitution, “the rules of English law were simply too strange to be rationalized or reworked on continental lines. Rules survived that did not make sense.”).
  28. LFFS, ch. 13, p. 341 and nn.141–42; see also Part IV.B (“Consideration and Gift Transfers”) of my “Title-Transfer Theory of Contract.”
  29. Richard A. Epstein, “The Static Conception of the Common Law,” J. Legal Stud. 9, no. 2 (1980): 253–89, at 258.
  30. Kinsella, “Epstein on Roman Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 18, 2025) (quoting Epstein on the Law Talk podcast); see also Richard Epstein, “Roman Law” (Classical Liberal Institute, NYU School of Law; YouTube).
  31. LFFS, ch. 13, p. 335 and nn.126–27 (discussing Richard A. Epstein, “Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,” Wash. U. L. Q. 64, no. 3 (1986): 667–722, at 680–81).
  32. See LFFS, ch. 19, p. 504 n.2 (Epstein “also favors intellectual property”); Kinsella, “KOL364 | Soho Forum Debate vs. Richard Epstein: Patent and Copyright Law Should Be Abolished,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Nov. 24, 2021). On the statutory origins of patent and copyright, and why they could not have arisen at common law, see idem, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” LFFS, ch. 14, Part III.E (“IP, Legislation, and the State”), p. 393 (“patent and copyright are statutory schemes, schemes that can be constructed only by legislation, and therefore have always been constructed by legislation. A patent or copyright code could no more arise in the decentralized, case-based legal system of a free society than could the Americans with Disabilities Act or Medicare”), originally published in Libertarian Papers 5, no. 1 (2013); idem, “Defamation as a Type of Intellectual Property,” in Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella, eds., A Life in Liberty: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Houston: Papinian Press, 2024), pp. 275–77, 280 (patent and copyright “are creatures of statute,” arising from the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 and the Statute of Anne of 1710, while trademark and trade secret “initially arose on the common law”; patent and copyright are “legislation-based upstarts”); idem, “The Problem with Intellectual Property,” Papinian Press Occasional Paper No. 2 (May 15, 2025), text at nn.55–56 (“The modern patent and copyright systems originated in statutes … that were themselves the results of state grants of monopoly privilege and censorship”) and the section “IP, Legislation, and the State”; idem, “Introduction to Origitent,” LFFS, ch. 16, pp. 442, 445; idem, “Why Objectivists Hate Anarchy (Hint: IP),” StephanKinsella.com (Aug. 17, 2009) (“you can’t have IP without a state–hell, you can’t have it without legislation”); and idem, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” LFFS, ch. 15, p. 415 n.46 (the old “common law copyright” was a doctrine “similar to trade secrets,” not “actual copyright”).
  33. LFFS, ch. 13, p. 341.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Kinsella, “Another Problem with Legislation: James Carter v. the Field Codes,” StephanKinsella.com (Oct. 14, 2009); LFFS, ch. 13, p. 348.
  36. See LFFS, ch. 13, Part V.B (“The Role of Commentators and Codes”); Kinsella, “On the Role of Commentators and Codes and the Oracles of the Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 31, 2025).
  37. LFFS, ch. 24, p. 653 and n.19; Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” J. Libertarian Stud. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977): 3–13; Murray N. Rothbard, “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts,” in The Ethics of Liberty (1982), ch. 19.
  38. Barnett, however, does reject the Rothbard-Evers title-transfer theory (and presumably my elaborations of it). As he wrote to me: “A “title transfer theory” does not identify the legal/conceptual criteria by which commitments to transfer entitlements become legally enforceable, which is what contract theory seeks to identify. That criteria, I maintain, is the manifestation of intent to be legally bound or “consent.” As a label for the theory of contractual obligation, “title transfer” begs the question.” Randy E. Barnett, personal correspondence with the author (2024), quoted in Kinsella, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract,” n.15.
  39. James R. Maxeiner, “When Are Agreements Enforceable? Giving Consideration to Professor Barnett’s Consent Theory of Contract,” Ius Gentium 12 (Spring 2006): 92–114, at 107–08; see also ibid., pp. 103–05 (comparing the Principles of European Contract Law, art. 2:101; the Dutch Civil Code, art. 3:33; and the BGB’s concepts of the juridical act and declaration of will).
  40. Maxeiner, “When Are Agreements Enforceable?,” p. 105 and n.47; Kinsella, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract” (update).
  41. Kinsella, “Epstein on Roman Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 18, 2025) (quoting Epstein on the Law Talk podcast).
  42. Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code, p. 15; see also La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
  43. LFFS, ch. 9, p. 221.
  44. Jesús Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006), chs. 1–3; Kinsella, “Fractional-Reserve Banking, Contracts of Deposit, and the Title-Transfer Theory of Contract,” Mises Economics Blog (Aug. 13, 2009) (quoting Huerta de Soto: in a deposit, “the depositary or custodian does not acquire title to the property”); idem, “The Great Fractional Reserve/Free Banking Debate,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 29, 2016).
  45. Kinsella, “Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes,” Mises Economics Blog (June 23, 2011), republished at C4SIF Blog; see also idem, “Restrictive Covenants, Reserved Rights, and Copyright,” StephanKinsella.com (Feb. 2020).
  46. Kinsella, “Erudite, Scholarly, and Unfailingly Polite: To Sean Gabb on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday,” StephanKinsella.com (Dec. 15, 2019).
  47. LFFS, ch. 19 (“Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law”), pp. 503–04 and n.2 (noting that Richard Epstein “has contributed enormously to libertarian and legal theory, but is not a completely consistent libertarian and is certainly not an anarcho-capitalist”). See also Kinsella, “Afterword,” in Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (Laissez Faire Books, 2012; 2d expanded ed., Mises Institute, 2021) (“Brainpower and genius alone are not enough to provide sound social analysis. One also needs a coherent understanding of economics … And one needs a coherent and realistic understanding of politics and the state”); idem, “Faculty Spotlight Interview: Stephan Kinsella,” StephanKinsella.com (June 2021); and idem, “Penner on Intellectual Property, Monopolies, and Property,” C4SIF Blog (May 2025), n.5.
  48. Kinsella, “Epstein on Roman Law,” StephanKinsella.com (July 18, 2025), and n.6.
  49. “KOL474 | Where the Common Law Goes Wrong (PFS 2025)” (invoking Chesterton’s fence).
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Crooke on the EU as America’s No-Longer-Useful Vassal

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Alastair Crooke argues that the EU was a US project all along, and that Washington no longer has much use for it.

From Alastair Crooke, “The European Union Watershed Moment” Forum Geopolitica (reprinted at LewRockwell.com, Nov. 18, 2026):

The EU construct was always a US concept with a purpose. Its purpose was to sustain US pre-eminence over the post-war European space … It was, in short, a purely mercantile project, dressed up in the frills of liberalism …

The EU is no longer a useful vassal (beyond the writing of cheques to Zelensky). …

For Europe assumes the costs and political risks of acting as disposable proxy to effect the weakening of Russia.

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Crooke writes as a geopolitical realist, not a libertarian, but his account confirms what Hans-Hermann Hoppe has long argued: since 1945 Western Europe has been a collection of US vassal states, and the EU a US-backed centralizing project.

In 2016 Hoppe said that “the central purpose of the EU, supported all-along by the USA, was always the weakening in particular of Germany,” as a step toward “a European Super-State, and ultimately of a one-world government, dominated by the USA and its central bank, the FED.”1 In his 2022 PFS talks on Germany he was blunter: “The BRD—West Germany, and after 1990 also the unified Germany—was and still is a vassal of the United States.”2 On Ukraine, Europe’s political elites “followed the US orders to the dot,” sending money and weapons that “will have to be paid for by their own people through massive inflation and impoverishment.”3 That is Crooke’s “disposable proxy” in a nutshell. And in his 2025 Mises Memorial Lecture, Hoppe said that after World War II, “All of Europe, all of Western Europe became immediately vassals of the United States,” every one of them a NATO member hosting American troops.4

What’s new, per Crooke, is that the master no longer finds the vassal useful. Hoppe’s remedy for Europe is not a stronger Brussels to stand up to Washington but the opposite: radical decentralization, a Europe of “1,000 Liechtensteins.”5

Related

  1. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The EU: Economically and Morally Perverse,” LewRockwell.com (July 13, 2016), an interview first published in the Polish weekly Najwyższy Czas!. See also “Hoppe on Europe, the EU, the US and the Rest (interview in English and German),” HansHoppe.com (Oct. 2016).
  2. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Growing to Understand Contemporary Germany and Weep – Part I,” LewRockwell.com (Oct. 15, 2022). See also “Hoppe on Germany, East and West, Russia/Ukraine, and US-NATO (PFS 2022),” Property and Freedom Society (Oct. 4, 2022).
  3. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Growing to Understand Contemporary Germany and Weep – Part II,” LewRockwell.com (Oct. 17, 2022).
  4. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Considerations and Reflections of a Veteran Reactionary Libertarian,” Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, Austrian Economics Research Conference, Mises Institute (Mar. 21, 2025), at 1:00:01 [quoting the transcript posted at HansHoppe.com].
  5. “Hoppe: ‘My Dream Is of a Europe Which Consists of 1,000 Liechtensteins’,” Mises Wire (Apr. 16, 2022) [translated from a ServusTV discussion].
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Twenty Years of Watts Up With That? – What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been

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Today's Deeeeep Question From Penn State: Should We 'Decolonize' Holocaust Museums?

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Don't Fret, the Dems Will Blow It

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★ The 50-Yard Line

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Ever since the Huang/Nvidia scandal erupted, I’ve been thinking about a short post I wrote back in March, under the headline “Jensen Huang Doesn’t Smell Anything”:

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, during an on-stage interview at The Hill & Valley Forum last week, was asked “What do you see as America’s unique advantages that other countries don’t have?”

His answer, after taking a moment to think, “America’s unique advantage that no country could possibly have is President Trump.”

Huang, newly appointed to the aforelinked President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, seemingly doesn’t smell the growing stink.

The stink was the historically low (and sinking) popularity to which Trump’s 2.0 presidency had sunk, just one year in. Undeniable to anyone in touch with reality. Huang’s obsequious Trump-fellating answer to that question would have been eye-catching even a year prior, when Trump first rolled back into office with an aggressive agenda and a surplus of political capital from a clear election victory — but it was, frankly, a startling thing to say in March 2026. It makes a lot more sense, though, given what’s come to light in the last 10 days.

If you’re not paying close attention you might think Huang’s was the sort of answer any major tech CEO might have given. But it’s not. That was a really unusual thing for Huang to say, way out of line with how corporate leaders typically approach politics. The typical approach for large publicly held corporations is to avoid partisan politics. Advocate only for policies directly related to the company’s business, and otherwise stay out. The political winds change direction every few years. George Bush senior in 1988 was the last new president elected from the same party as the outgoing incumbent, and he only lasted one term. It makes no sense for a corporation that intends to continue thriving for more than the next few years to closely align itself with one party — unless they believe that party will remain in power for the foreseeable future, à la the FDR/Truman Democrats, who won five consecutive presidential elections from 1932 to 1948 (and seven out of nine through 1968).

One metaphor I use for politics is a football field. Democrats on the left, Republicans on the right. CEOs typically stay as close as they can to the 50-yard line in the middle of the field. That way, when an election puts the other party in power, they don’t have to move — they just need to turn around. That’s how someone like Tim Cook could maintain good relations with the White House from Obama to Trump to Biden back to Trump again. He just stayed close to midfield and turned around after each election.

Remaining as close as possible to political midfield under Trump required unseemly obsequious tribute, unprecedented in modern U.S. history. Million-dollar tickets to his inauguration. That ridiculous gold trophy. Embarrassing stuff. But that’s ultimately a reflection of Trump’s avarice, not the politics of Cook personally or Apple as a company. That was the price to stay on the 50-yard line. Cook has often repeated that his two personal heroes are Martin Luther King Jr. and Bobby Kennedy (senior, to be clear). He keeps portraits of both of them in his office. He never swapped them out for portraits of, say, Ronald Reagan. Apple never changed its internal policies or language regarding racial and LGBT equality. The Apple homepage never stopped celebrating Martin Luther King Jr. Day — even when it coincided with Trump’s second inauguration.

And yet Trump remains so enamored of Cook that he floated his name to succeed Huang at Nvidia. Tim Apple remains the apple of Trump’s eye. Yet Apple had nothing to change or apologize for when Biden came into office, nor will they again if, as now seems likely, Trump is succeeded in 2029 by a Democrat elected to clean up his kakistocratic kleptomaniacal mess. (Presumably Apple will gladly pony up at least another $25 million to restore the East Wing after Trump’s architecturally ungodly ballroom edifice is torn down.) And Apple certainly won’t need lawyers to defend them from charges of corruption and/or breaches of national security. Nvidia, not so much.

This is what we should want: business leaders who endeavor to stay out of partisan politics, not hopelessly enmesh themselves in it. Industry and politics cannot operate in isolation, but they should avoid intertwinement except where necessary. Great companies stand the test of time. That’s not feasible if you hitch your corporate wagon to one party or the other, no matter the political moment. We don’t think of Procter & Gamble, Coca-Cola, or Berkshire Hathaway as being Democratic or Republican companies. You cannot chart their fortunes over time based on which party was in power in any given decade. You may well have strong political opinions that are far from the 50-yard line, on one side or the other. I do. But you shouldn’t look for those opinions to be validated by industry executives, any more than you should look for business and product-design decisions to be made by elected government officials. True American values put country over party when it comes to business. And, as Calvin Coolidge aptly put it, “The chief business of the American people is business.”

America does possess unique advantages that other countries don’t have. Personal liberties enshrined in our Bill of Rights. A vibrant, diverse, ever-changing melting pot of a citizenry. A strong tradition of the rule of law, placing no man above it. Competitive markets that allow new entrants to supplant entrenched incumbents. Any CEO worth their salt should have an answer to the question of America’s unique advantages that holds true no matter who, from which party, is currently president. And they should believe it.

What makes Huang’s answer so off-putting isn’t that it was so abjectly partisan — politically tone-deaf to the inevitability of Democrats coming back into power, and perversely obsequious to Trump personally — but that Donald Trump is the antithesis to the entire above list of things that actually give America unique advantages other countries don’t have. Trump and the MAGA movement are also decidedly American and uniquely so, but they represent what’s worst about America.

But I give Huang credit for honesty. Clearly, he believed what he said. Huang didn’t just stray from the 50-yard line — he broke for Trump’s end zone.

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