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Lao Gu: Asset Disclosure for Officials—Where’s the Problem?

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Austrian School Lao Gu, “Asset Disclosure for Officials: Where’s the Problem?,” Ludwig von Mises Substack (Nov. 19, 2026), translated from the Chinese original (Nov. 19, 2026).

Writing from Guangdong, Lao Gu takes on the perennial demand that officials disclose their assets: disclosure is a means, not an end, and without a workable mechanism it is just a slogan, since in China the money sits with relatives and guanxi networks and no one can audit millions of officials. The real cure for corruption, he argues, is to strip officials of the discretionary power that makes bribes worth paying, as China’s post-Mao market reforms did. (Compare Mises on how bureaucratic discretion forces the entrepreneur to resort to “diplomacy and bribery,” in the Related list below.)

Asset Disclosure for Officials

Where’s the Problem?

Austrian School Lao Gu • Ludwig von Mises Substack • Nov. 19, 2026

Written by Austrian School Lao Gu in Guangdong Province, China at 6:29 a.m. on 19 November 2026.

Asset disclosure for public officials. It’s been kicked around online for years.

Someone in a group chat asked me today, “What do you think?”

How does the Austrian framework look at it?

In all this noise, asset disclosure gets treated as an end, never as a means. Why? Because the people demanding it have never once said how it should be done.

That’s the tell with most of this crowd. They love shouting “I want this, I want that,” but they never touch the machinery. Look at Spain — punters on the street demanding cheap rent, demanding they not be chucked out. How? Silence. The whole European protest wave, and all you hear is “we want to survive, we want to afford heating, we want higher wages.”

Japan’s got the same row going right now over cutting the consumption tax. Takaichi Sanae says cut tax and boost welfare. The public claps. The other half of the political class goes, “Are you a wizard? You’re spending more and collecting less?”

Same as the social-democratic lot — always bleating about the government needing to hand out more, rescue the poor, free this, free that. But never, ever, where the money comes from. Whose pocket it’s being lifted out of to line someone else’s.

They claim they understand politics. They understand bollocks. You don’t even grasp that money for A has to come out of B, and yet you want a seat at the table. Pull the other one.

Qin Hui’s exactly the same — never says where the welfare he wants is funded from.

It’s no different from lighting a candle in a temple and asking a god for a favour.

Anyone with two brain cells who actually understands politics goes straight to the means.

Right, back to asset disclosure. Someone says, “What’s hard about it? Just copy the developed world. Loads of countries do civil servant asset declarations.” Fine — let’s pretend we copy them.

You’ll twig pretty sharpish that the mechanism doesn’t land in China.

Take Official A. Parks his bribes in his wife’s brother’s name. His own books are spotless — salary, that’s it. What have you actually solved?

Official B? Takes bribes in cash, antiques, gold. Good luck tracing that through a bank account.

You twig immediately: digging out someone’s real wealth needs conditions. In China there are far more of those conditions than in Europe or the States.

China runs on guanxi, on clan. An official parking assets with a close relative isn’t a hurdle — it’s the default, and it’s what the corruption cases actually look like.

So a personal declaration form? Useless. Name me one official nicked in recent years who had a few hundred million sitting in their own current account, dozens of flats in their own name, shares in a company under their own signature. They’d have to be a proper mug.

To actually find the money you’d have to audit every relative, friend, schoolmate, kid. But before there’s even a lead — on what grounds? Because your uncle’s a civil servant, the state gets to rummage through your accounts, every transaction you’ve ever done, to check whether your uncle greased the wheels?

There are millions of civil servants with real power in China, plus state-owned enterprise and public institution cadres — 10 million+ easy. Call it 10 tight connections each: family, relatives, mates, classmates. Do the maths on who you’d be investigating.

So “asset disclosure” with no method attached is just noise. It’s virtue-signalling. People proving how righteous they are, how much they care about holding power to account. None of them can actually draft a workable policy.

Because any real proposal has to specify the means. Not just the slogan.

And the naive ones think that the moment the form lands, officials will declare tens of millions and we’ll be arresting them by the lorry-load. Are you having a laugh? Nursery level, that is.

Name me one official anywhere on earth who voluntarily ticked “yes, I took bribes” on a declaration form. One. That’s the whole point — the form is theatre.

It’s like handing every punter a sheet saying “please declare whether you’ve committed a crime. Criminals, raise your hand.”

And why did they still believe it? Because at nursery, if you ask “who’s asleep?” during nap time, a bunch of kids put their hand up. True story.

Push further. Why disclose at all? Because they hold power, and we want to stop them using it for private gain.

Fine. Preventing corruption becomes the end. Disclosure is just one means — assuming you’d built a working one.

So ask the honest question: is disclosure the only lever? If it is, then the derived lever is auditing the entire social orbit of the official — accounts, transactions, who they met last Tuesday — pre-emptively, not after the fact.

Sex bribery? What’s the method there — a nightly log of who they shagged?

You’d need another 5 million civil servants to run that. Then another 1 million to stop those 5 million taking bribes from the people they’re investigating. The thing eats itself.

Now try the other lever.

Official has the power to approve floor-area ratios. Developer slips him a backhander for a higher ratio. Option one: audit every relative and mate of that official forever. Option two: abolish the approval power.

Kill the discretion, and the corruption has nowhere to sit.

Look at the registrar issuing marriage licences. Worried they’ll be bribed? Not really — they can’t block you getting married. They’re a public notary stamping a certificate.

Change the job. Make them run a background check, vet the bride-price, refuse the licence if it fails. Corruption risk? 100%. Guaranteed.

Pre-reform era: you needed a letter of introduction to travel. No connections, no letter — unless you slipped someone a tip. Normal.

Half of Africa: customs clearance is a toll booth. Pay the man, cross the border.

Once you run it through ends-and-means, it’s obvious. There are loads of ways to fight corruption, and the cleanest one is shrinking the power.

China’s already walked that road — from heavy corruption in the 1970s to something far cleaner now. People just misread it, which is why nobody thinks properly about the actual machinery. It’s all emotion, no analysis.

Was it less corrupt before reform? Don’t be daft. Far worse. Only the sums were smaller because the economy was knackered, so it looked smaller. It was systemic, everywhere. And the people who say “there wasn’t much corruption back then” were often up to their necks in it.

Take the “zhou gongzi” lot — the ones who announce they’re inheriting their dad’s post. Everyone’s furious now. But in the 1970s and 1980s, job inheritance at state firms was codified policy.

The 1978 State Council “Interim Measures on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers” let children take over a retiring worker’s slot — drivers, typists, cleaners included. Some provinces stretched it to party and government bodies, cultural and medical institutions too. Openly.

Inside state firms, internal exams were quietly rigged for the staff’s own kids. Outsiders barely got a look-in.

And anyone who says those state-sector workers weren’t corrupt — they were the beneficiaries. They didn’t call it corruption. They called it “a perk.” If the factory director got more, they moaned he got more. If someone else’s kid got in and theirs didn’t, that was the injustice.

Where does “pulling strings” come from? The 1960s–70s. For educated youth and rural kids, joining the army, getting a factory job, getting into university were the few exits — and the door only opened for the connected. Hu Yaobang’s own daughter admitted she joined up in 1969 via the back door. Some lads had their army slot nicked outright by someone with better lineage.

Factory quotas were the main route home from the countryside. Almost none, all in the hands of local cadres. So it was systemic string-pulling, skimmed at every layer, kids of cadres first.

Higher cadres’ kids got shipped back via the army or a factory slot in no time. Ordinary educated youth rotted in the field for years.

Worker-peasant-soldier university places in the 1970s? “Recommended by the masses” — meaning recommended by whoever had the connections. In 1972 the centre even issued a notice specifically to “stop back-door behaviour in university admissions.” That tells you the scale.

Everything was rationed, so the ration coupons themselves became the back door. To scrape together enough industrial coupons for a bike you were begging favours all over town. Even with coupons you might still not get the goods. The “three bigs and a radio” — bike, sewing machine, watch, radio — usually needed a manager’s chit as well. Warehouse insiders tipped off their favourites. Sometimes even money plus coupons got you nothing. Light bulbs, for instance.

And that’s just the city kids and the state-sector families — who were themselves part of the machine, just resentful they got a smaller slice.

Out in the villages, if your dad wasn’t a brigade or commune cadre, forget the army, forget university, forget the coupons. Just forget it.

Compare that with now. Do you need connections to buy anything? To buy a flat? To get into university? To join the army? To get a factory job? To travel? To get a raise? To get married? To see a doctor?

Marketisation stripped out a huge slab of approval power. Ordinary life is less touched by an official’s discretion than at any point in Chinese history.

And yet the same crowd pines for the old privileges — lifetime tenure, never-sacked state-adjacent status, the cradle-to-grave package. They’re not against corruption. They’re jealous of it.

At the same time they demand more official power — more licensing, more inspection, more control over school dinners, uniforms, hospital prices, platforms, product quality — and then turn round and demand asset disclosure to police it.

You’ve just voted to hand the power back, then act surprised the money moves. Absolute farce.

The right anti-corruption path is the one China actually walked: cut the power, grow the market. If everyone twigged that going from 1970s systemic backscratching to a life where nobody needs a chit to buy a loaf is the giant leap forward — then keep walking that way and the problem shrinks on its own.

Get the causality backwards and you pick the wrong tool. Asset disclosure, pushed as the answer, is the wrong tool. Shrinking the power is the only real fix.

The Chinese public got the benefit of this and still can’t see it. Bloody infuriating.

***

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Lao Gu on Who Jensen Huang Has Really Pissed Off

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Austrian School Lao Gu, “Who Jensen Huang Has Really Pissed Off,” Ludwig von Mises Substack (Nov. 20, 2026), translated from the Chinese original (Nov. 18, 2026).

Writing from Guangdong, Austrian-school writer Lao Gu argues that Jensen Huang’s fall at Nvidia1 has little to do with his affairs and much to do with politics. Huang’s push to sell advanced chips to China made enemies of Washington’s China hawks, rival American AI labs, and defense contractors. What we are seeing, he says, is the state steering a private company, which is an awkward look for an administration that ran against the “deep state.” (For a related angle, see Peter Wong’s piece on Chinese elites and America’s CEO suites, in the Related list below.) In your editor’s view. it’s not surprising at all he was ousted. In today’s climate, publicly traded companies are very risk averse.

Who Jensen Huang Has Really Pissed Off

Written by Austrian School Lao Gu in Guangdong Province, China at 2:48 p.m. on 18 November 2026.

This Jensen Huang business is off. Properly off.

Extramarital carry-on? In the US, among the big-tech bosses, that’s barely a footnote. Bill Gates not only cheated and got divorced, he turned up in the Epstein mess too. Clinton’s business with his secretary went all the way into congressional testimony in lurid detail, and he walked away untouched [Note: Monica Lewinsky was a White House intern, not Clinton’s secretary. —Ed.]. Musk has kids with subordinates, with all sorts of women.

So how the hell does this turn into him being pushed out?

By any sane logic, a man’s private life and the running of his company have sweet nothing to do with each other. From the shareholders’ side, the only thing that matters is whether he can run the shop, not how many affairs he’s had.

And yet a bloke pulling in hundreds of billions a year, a genuine operating genius, gets shown the door by his own board.

Where are the shareholders in all this? Look at the tape — Nvidia’s share price tanked. So ask yourself: why on earth would shareholders want Huang gone? That’s just torching their own money.

Which means this whole thing is weird. Properly weird.

Standing behind that board are Huang’s enemies.

So who has he crossed? Plenty. In a free market, a cracking entrepreneur like him serves everyone’s interest — his kit makes entire industries more efficient, his company hands fat pay packets to thousands of staff. But stick that same man inside an interventionist political machine and suddenly he’s got targets on his back.

Enemy number 1: the politicians

Both the Democrats and the Trump camp have hardline factions screaming for chip controls on China. Inside Trump’s outfit, Rubio is the ringleader of the hardline-within-the-hardline.

Huang represents the business lobby that keeps whispering in Trump’s ear, and he’s talked Trump round more than once on easing chip restrictions to China.

Perfectly natural, really. I’m the bloke flogging the gear — of course I want the whole world buying it.

Huang has said it over and over: cut us off and China just builds its own Nvidia killers. Ban the sale, and you hand Beijing a head start and lose the market at the same time.

Trump got partly talked round — H100-class chips got loosened a bit. [Note: Trump cleared Nvidia’s H200 for sale to China in Dec. 2025, not “H100-class” chips. —ed.]

That did not go down well with the hawks. Not in Trump’s camp, not with the Democratic hardliners on the Hill either. The line was “choke them off”, and here’s some suit from Silicon Valley gumming up the grand strategy. Right. Time to have him.

Enemy number 2: the other tech bosses

Nvidia is so far ahead on GPUs that the rest are still breathing its dust. There’s basically no race.

So who wants Huang gone? His own customers — the American AI labs building the world’s front-running models.

Because their real competition sits in China. DeepSeek. Kimi K3. One showed brutal cost efficiency, the other showed catching-up intelligence at speed. And that’s with the West throttling high-end AI chips into China.

Now imagine Huang gets his way and ships more top-end silicon over there. The Yanks in those labs are staring into the abyss.

Swapping a foundation model takes editing 2 lines of config. The servers can sit anywhere. AI has no borders, never did.

That’s why they’d sooner see him gone.

Enemy number 3: the military-industrial lot

Politicians of every stripe treat choking Chinese AI as policy, and the reason underneath the reason is defence. AI plus robotics is the next weapons platform, and everyone can see it coming. Frontier models are the substrate under all of it.

Pulling more military budget, using AI to leapfrog a manufacturing base that’s stopped growing — that’s the shared faith of the Pentagon crowd and the contractors feeding off it.

So when Huang pushes for more supply into Asia-Pacific, this lot quietly lose their rag.

Which explains the strange theatre we’re watching. Intel types leak that Huang has “spy concerns”. The White House inner circle says bollocks, no intelligence issue. Then Congress wades in, demanding a fresh look at his links to that Singapore outfit, floating criminal referral.

Intel plants the story, the press runs it, pressure lands on the board, Congress follows. Who exactly pulled which lever, we’ll never know.

But one thing’s plain: this isn’t business. This is politics.

Getting rid of Huang means Nvidia’s steering wheel in this one corner has moved from the entrepreneur to the politician. It’s nationalisation by the back door — “strategic resource, therefore state hands”. And behind those politicians sit other tech giants’ balance sheets.

The deep-state politicos say: Huang, you slippery little git, you only know how to turn a profit and you’ll bugger up the big plan.

The deep-state bosses say: Huang, you slippery little git, you only care about Nvidia’s profit and you’ll bugger up our future.

Trump built his whole run on promising to smash the deep state — that shadow government run not by elected officials but by the interests behind them.

Turns out his own government works exactly the same way.

***

Related

  1. Huang resigned as Nvidia’s CEO and from its board on Nov. 12, 2026, amid reports of two extramarital affairs, one with a woman U.S. officials suspect of spying for China. See “NVIDIA Announces CEO Transition,” NVIDIA press release (Nov. 12, 2026); “Nvidia Board Says It Does Not Intend to Reinstate Jensen Huang as CEO,” NPR (Nov. 17, 2026).
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Win-Win Denial

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"One of the most persistent misconceptions in economics is the belief that whenever one person gains from a transaction, somebody else must lose. This assumption, sometimes described as win–win denial, reflects a failure to recognise that economic exchange can benefit both parties simultaneously. It is closely related to what economists and psychologists call zero-sum thinking: the belief that wealth is a fixed quantity, so that one person’s gain must necessarily come at another person’s expense.

"This misconception is surprisingly widespread. It appears in political arguments about profits, wages, international trade, inequality and the distribution of wealth. It encourages suspicion of commercial success and reinforces the belief that economic relationships are fundamentally contests between winners and losers. Yet much of the prosperity of modern civilisation depends upon precisely the opposite principle: that cooperation through voluntary exchange can create benefits for everyone involved. ...

"This [highlights] a fundamental economic principle: value is not necessarily the same for different people."
~ Tim Harding from his post 'Win–Win Denial'
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What Happens When Science Ignores Negative Results?

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In this episode of The Ayn Rand Institute Podcast, ARI Fellow Mike Mazza interviewed Stefan Gaillard, a PhD student in philosophy of science and co-founder of the Journal of Trial and Error. They discussed why scientists often fail to publish research that produces negative or unexpected results, how this practice distorts our understanding of scientific evidence, and why such results can be essential to scientific progress. They also explored the role of error and failure in scientific discovery, the incentives that discourage researchers from sharing unsuccessful experiments, and how scientific publishing practices might be improved.

Topics include:

  • Why scientists and academic journals are reluctant to publish negative or null results.

  • How this reluctance contributes to the replication crisis and distorts scientific knowledge.

  • The value of unsuccessful experiments in advancing scientific research.

  • How unpublished negative results can lead researchers to needlessly repeat work that others have already done.

  • The distinction between scientific errors, methodological failures, and negative results.

  • Why scientists sometimes feel ashamed of failures even when their research is rigorous.

  • How scientific journals and alternative publishing methods could better communicate negative research findings.

  • Why publishing negative results is increasingly important for AI-driven scientific research.

Thanks for reading New Ideal by The Ayn Rand Institute! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.





Download audio: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/225709025/5ba365530a533b49af3a48bb1d818ea5.mp3
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The Twists and Turns Continue in Donald Tusk's Preemptive Polish Project

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The Tamed Liberal West Doesn’t Understand the Threat of Islam

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