OURS OUR CHEAPER, TOO: U.S. Hits Iran With Iran’s Own Drone Design and I Can’t Stop Laughing. “All for the price of a nicely appointed Chevrolet Equinox.”

BUT OF COURSE: Bucknell economics course catalog features several Marxist and left-wing classes, appears to have altered some course descriptions. It’s fine to teach those things, though not to propagandize them.

Some observations and comments on Trump and Israel’s war on Iran:

1. Tehran is not looking for a ceasefire and has rejected outreach from Trump. The reason is that they believe they committed a mistake by agreeing to the ceasefire in June – it only enabled the US and Israel to restock and remobilize to launch war again. If they agree to a ceasefire now, they will only be attacked again in a few months.

2. For a ceasefire to be acceptable, it appears difficult for Tehran to agree to it until the cost to the US has become much higher than it currently is. Otherwise, the US will restart the war at a later point, the calculation reads.

3. Accordingly, Iran has shifted its strategy. It is striking Israel, but very differently from the June war. There is a constant level of attack throughout the day rather than a salvo of 50 missiles at once. Damage will be less, but that isn’t a problem because Tehran has concluded that Israel’s pain tolerance is very high – as long as the US stays in the war. So the focus shifts to the US.

4. From the outset, and perhaps surprisingly, Iran has been targeting US bases in the region, including against friendly states. Tehran calculates that the war can only end durably if the cost for the US rises dramatically, including American casualties. After the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran says it has no red lines left and will go all out in seeking the destruction of these bases and high American casualties.

5. Iran understands that many in the American security establishment had been convinced that Iran’s past restraint reflected weakness and an inability or unwillingness to face the US in a direct war. Tehran is now doing everything it can to demonstrate the opposite – despite the massive cost it itself will pay. Ironically, the assassination of Khamenei facilitated this shift.

6. One aspect of this is that Iran has now also struck bases in Cyprus, which have been used for attacks against Iran. Iran is well aware that this is an attack on a EU state. But that seems to be the point. Tehran appears intent on not only expanding the war into Persian Gulf states but also into Europe. Note the attack on the French base in the UAE. For the war to be able to end, Europe too has to pay a cost, the reasoning appears to be.

7. There appears to be only limited concern about the internal situation. The announcement of Khamenei’s death opened a window for people to pour onto the streets and seek to overthrow the regime. Though expressions of joy were widespread, no real mobilization was seen. That window is now closing, as the theocratic system closes ranks and establishes new formal leadership.

Again: The question “How will this end?” should have been asked before this war was triggered. It wasn’t.

That is from Trita Parsi, via B.  Note that some people consider Parsi a biased source (not sufficiently anti-Iran?), in any case it is worth pondering how other parties may view the current situation.

The post One view of Iranian strategy appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

I, FORTUNATELY, WOKE UP WHILE STILL IN MY TEENS:  Unfeminism. Or How I discovered that I’m not One Of Them.