1. “data centers are now responsible for nearly half of county tax revenue in Loudon County, VA”
2. The emerging role of competition in health care markets.
3. Did the Swedes boost tax revenue by abolishing their inheritance tax?
4. WSJ profile of Reihan Salam.
5. Are NJ diners doomed? (NYT)
6. How far back does European family structure go?
7. Why Coase needs Hayek, AI essay and the limits of the firm.
The post Sunday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
The excellent Patrick McKenzie has a very long Bits About Money post on the the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) indictment. It is filled with details about bank operating procedures. I’m going to summarize. The post is divided into what I think of as two parts. First, did the SPLC commit bank fraud? Second, what is the backstory behind the indictment?
The first part is simple, McKenzie argues that yes the SPLC committed bank fraud, more specifically false statements to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. §1014–the main reason why this is not a hard call is that almost any false statement made to influence a bank, no matter how small, is illegal and can get you 30 years. Moreover, the banks are essentially an investigatory arm of the state and they collect data for decades, any piece of which can generate an indictment. The main way in which the SPLC committed bank fraud is that they set up fake businesses to pay secret informants. Neither of these things, as far as I know, are per se illegal but lying to your bank about the ownership, control and purposes of accounts opened in fictitious business names is illegal.
When Bank-1 investigated, an SPLC employee asked the bank to close several of the accounts and transfer the remaining balances to an SPLC account. Later, SPLC’s president/CEO and board chair confirmed in writing that the accounts were opened for SPLC operations and operated under SPLC authority. As Patrick writes, the letter is “a succinct confession to bank fraud.” Thus, the case that the SPLC paid informants through bank accounts opened under fictitious business names appears strong.
But the government had long been aware of SPLC’s informant work, indeed the existence of the informant program has been public knowledge for decades. It’s hard to see how to run a secret network to pay informants without hiding some information–could the SPLC simply have told the bank what they were doing? It seems to me that the punishment for false statements to a bank ought to depend on the motive and intention of the false statements but the law isn’t written that way. Another administration, however, would certainly look away. Which brings us to the second part of the story.
The SPLC itself was embedded in banking and private-sector decision making. Suppose Acme Inc., a large business, wanted to offer its employees matching grants for charitable donations. Acme, however, doesn’t want newspaper headlines like “Acme donated to the KKK!” So Acme contracts with a firm that vets charitable donations, and that firm uses a blacklist created by the SPLC. This was routine. Amazon used the SPLC list for AmazonSmile; workplace-giving vendors used or advertised SPLC screening; all of this gave the SPLC and the broader Change the Terms coalition power to pressure social media, tech, and financial infrastructure firms over speech, blacklisting, and payments because they were already in the door and embedded in their systems.
When the SPLC was mostly identifying nearly universally despised organizations like the KKK, all of this was more or less accepted by everyone in the know, except perhaps for a few hard core civil-libertarians. But in the woke era the SPLC overplayed their hand. The SPLC and related organizations began to take on conservative, Trump affiliated organizations with widespread support. Through a massive PR and outreach campaign they pressured social media organizations, tech firms, and finance firms to follow along–and this was not just a media campaign, the Change the Terms coalition had hundreds of meetings with top level staff. The partisan nature made it legally questionable but when your allies are in power. these things can be overlooked. In perhaps the most remarkable part of the document, Patrick quotes a donor fundraising letter from Free Press and Free Press Action (not the SPLC but part of the larger coalition):
Our efforts have yielded numerous concrete changes. After years of pressure from Free Press and our allies, Twitter finally banned Trump[.]
…Facebook initially suspended Trump “indefinitely” and later changed his suspension to a two-year ban. We’re now pushing the company to permanently ban Trump and to close a loophole that’s allowing a Trump PAC to fundraise and organize on his behalf.
…FUND THE FIGHT. Your generosity makes our work possible. Please give what you can today to make sure we have the resources we need to keep fighting for equitable media policies that improve people’s lives.
As Patrick notes, the fund raising letter closed with the following deadpan disclaimer:
Free Press and Free Press Action are nonpartisan organizations….Free Press and Free Press Action do not support or oppose any candidate for public office.
Trump won. Many people will say the indictment is the result. That may well be true but that doesn’t make the indictment legally weak.
Read the whole thing for a lesson in how SPLC’s list and coalition work became embedded in private-sector decisioning systems and more generally for a behind the scenes look at how institutional power actually works.
The post The Southern Poverty Law Center Indictment appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
In Modern Principles, Tyler and I show the invisible hand by telling the story of how the increase in oil prices in the 1970s encouraged millions of adjustments in how goods were produced and allocated, everything from an increased use of brick for driveways to a movement of the flower market from the US, which relied on heating greenhouses, to warmer climes like Columbia and Kenya. See the I, Rose video!
The FT has an amusing update:
“When my sheep break wind, it smells of roses,” he said, recounting one of the more bizarre and far-flung consequences of the decision by US President Donald Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to bomb Iran in February.
Since Tehran hit back by firing drones and missiles at US allies in the Gulf — grounding cargo flights and closing off the Strait of Hormuz through which booming east African trade with the region used to flow — Mahihu has been forced to jettison millions of rose stems.
The post Rose Farts and the Invisible Hand appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
We might be heading towards a populist backlash towards AI, but we’re not there yet. Outside the tech bubble, Americans really don’t care about AI yet.
AI is Americans’ 29th most important issue, according to the fantastic survey @davidshor ran that everyone is rightly looking at.
It’s not surprising that Americans will answer sentiment questions about AI negatively, as they’ve been negative towards tech for a while. But it’s a big leap from negative sentiment to meaningful political action.
Americans have been negative on social media for 10 years, and there has been no meaningful political action. And that’s despite all the other hallmarks of backlash people are saying about AI—violent extremists (people forget there was a shooting at YouTube HQ), protests, etc.
My prediction: we will get real populist backlash to AI when the unemployment moves by, say, 2 percentage points and people see it as caused by AI.
That is part of a longer tweet from Andy Hall.
The post Do Americans really hate AI? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
In December 2025, Australia became the first country to ban youth under 16 years old from holding accounts on major social media platforms, a policy now under consideration in more than a dozen countries and in numerous states. Because social media use is inherently social, the effectiveness of a ban that is easy to circumvent may depend on whether compliance reaches a tipping point: a share of compliant peers high enough to make it optimal for individuals to comply themselves. We surveyed 835 Australian teenagers four months after the ban took effect and find that only about one in four 14–15-year-olds comply. The social environment around use has barely moved: most banned teens believe that their peers are still using banned platforms and cite social reasons for continuing use. Sustaining high compliance requires two ingredients: the share of compliers must be high enough and those who comply must find it preferable to continue complying. The current ban achieves neither. Teenagers report that they require roughly two-thirds of peers to stop using social media to stop themselves, far above the share currently complying. They also perceive compliers as less popular than non-compliers, so the more influential teens disproportionately stay on the platforms. Together, these patterns suggest that compliance is more likely to diminish than to rise. Sustaining higher compliance will likely require pairing the ban with instruments that act on social norms and individual incentives directly.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
A few days ago I was talking with a very smart fifteen year old in Australia (really). He was of the opinion that it was quite ineffective, though he noted he could no longer access LinkedIn. I would note there are more stringent measures, requiring more governmental monitoring and control of the internet, that perhaps could have a greater effect.
The post The social media ban in Australia, how is it going? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
Log in
